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STOCK BROKER FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND THE
IMPACT OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT
THOMAS LEE HAZEN*
In recent years there has been concern about the sufficiency of
broker-dealer regulation. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 mandates the SEC to review and
evaluate existing regulation and to adopt such rules as may be
necessary to enhance existing regulation. Existing SEC and FINRA
rulemaking addresses broker-dealer conduct, but by and large the
regulation has been based on principles and standards rather than
voluminous detailed rules specifying prohibited conduct. This
article examines the extent to which additional regulation is
warranted and whether to continue to rely on principles-based
regulation, or whether there should be more explicit rules to
heighten broker-dealer standards. The article concludes that
although the existing framework for broker-dealer regulation is
robust, it could be fine-tuned by possibly adding an express
fiduciary duty requirement as well as more specific rule-based
prohibitions.
I.INTRODUCTrION
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis,' after many months
of proposals and legislative hearings, Congress cobbled together a
compromise bill that emerged from both the House and the
Senate. The final product was embodied in the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 ("Dodd-
Frank").2  Dodd-Frank is massive legislation, with its text
exceeding eight hundred pages, and represents the most
comprehensive financial regulation ever adopted by Congress
when measured by the number of subjects, activities, and financial
* Cary C. Boshamer Distinguished Professor of Law, the University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill. BA 1969, JD 1972 Columbia University. Portions of this article are
adapted from Thomas Lee Hazen, Are Existing Stock Broker Standards Sufficient?
Principles, Rules, and Fiduciary Duties, 2010 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 710 (2010).
1. For an analysis of the financial crisis, see, e.g., 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 1 (2009)
(including a series of articles analyzing causes and suggested solutions).
2. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
institutions that are covered by its provisions. A relatively small
portion of Dodd-Frank covers broker-dealers'" duties to their
customers. Section 913 of Dodd-Frank4 mandated an SEC study
to examine broker-dealer and investment adviser obligations prior
to engaging in any rulemaking activity. Section 913 explicitly gives
the SEC rulemaking authority to require broker-dealers and
investment advisers to meet a uniform fiduciary standard when
they provide personalized securities-related investment advice to
their retail customers.! More specifically, under Dodd-Frank's
rulemaking authority, investment advisers providing personalized
investment advice to retail customers may be required to act in the
best interest of the customer without regard to the financial or
other interest of the adviser providing the advice. The SEC
rulemaking authority also allows the SEC to subject broker-
dealers to the same standard of care as investment advisers under
the Investment Advisers Act.! Any such rule must require
material conflicts of interest to be disclosed and consented to by
the customer. Dodd-Frank also recognizes, however, that broker-
dealers and investment advisers may be allowed to receive
commissions without violating the fiduciary standard applicable to
those industry professionals.' In addition the SEC's rulemaking
authority over broker-dealers now includes the ability to adopt
rules to require that broker-dealers who sell proprietary or a
3. Section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 addresses the regulation of
"brokers" and "dealers." 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2006). A securities broker under section
3(a)(4)(A) of the Securities Exchange Act is "any person engaged in the business of
effecting transactions in securities for the account of others." 15 U.S.C. §
78c(a)(4)(A) (2006). A securities dealer under section 3(a)(5)(A) is "any person
engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for such person's own account
through a broker or otherwise." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5)(A) (2006). As used in this
article, broker-dealer refers to a broker that is subject to 1934 Act regulation.
4. Dodd-Frank Act, § 913, 124 Stat. 1824-30 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o,
80b-11).
5. Id.
6. Id. Any such standard would have to be at least as rigorous as investment
advisers' existing obligations under section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act. 15
U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2006). This mandate already is embodied in the standards under
existing law. See id.
7. Dodd-Frank Act, § 913, 124 Stat. 1824-30 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o,
80b-11).
8. Id.
[Vol. 1548
STOCK BROKER FIDUCIARY DUTIES
limited range of products provide notice to the customer and
obtain the customer's consent or acknowledgement.9
As discussed later in this article, in January 2011, the SEC
responded with a study on broker-dealer regulation and
recommended a unified fiduciary duty standard for broker-dealers
and for investment advisers.'o The true impact of the study must
await SEC rulemaking and or interpretations that may follow over
the next year or two. Some observers had voiced concern that the
SEC would respond with overbearing regulation. This article
analyzes broker-dealer obligations and concludes that much of the
concern over Dodd-Frank in this area is overblown, as broker-
dealers are already subject to significant fiduciary-like obligations
when acting as more than mere order takers for their customers.
Even without any enhancements that may be forthcoming
as a result of Dodd-Frank, the existing law is clear that securities
broker-dealers are held to various obligations when their activities
consist of more than executing their customers' orders." This is
the case even in the absence of statutory or SEC rules specifically
setting forth the types of conduct that are prohibited. Rather than
being rooted in a specific statutory mandate, and beyond defining
"just and equitable principles of trade,"12 the obligations evolved
out of SEC and self-regulatory rules adopted by the National
9. Id.
10. See SEC STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS - AS
REQUIRED BY SECTION 913 OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION Act (2011) [hereinafter SEC STUDY],
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf.
11. See generally 5 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES
REGULATION CH. 14 (6th ed. 2009 & Supp. 2011) (analyzing broker-dealer regulation
under the federal securities laws); Thomas Lee Hazen, Are Existing Stock Broker
Standards Sufficient? Principles, Rules and Fiduciary Duties, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 710 (2010).
12. Prior to 1983, section 15(b)(9) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
referred to "rules and regulations as the Commission might prescribe designed to
promote just and equitable principles of trade, to remove impediments to and perfect
the mechanism of a free and open market and a national market system, and, in
general, to protect investors and the public interest." See Pub. L. No. 98-38, 97 Stat
205. Adherence to just and equitable principles of trade remains at the center of
broker-dealer regulation. See, e.g., FINRA Manual Rule 2010 ("Standards of
Commercial Honor and Principles of Trade"), available at
http://finra.complinet.comlen/display/display-viewall.html?rbid=2403&element-id=6
07&record id=609.
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Association of Securities Dealers (the "NASD")13 and now by its
successor, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
("FINRA"). In contrast to the approach to broker-dealers taken
in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"),14
investment advisers are regulated under the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940," which explicitly imposes on advisers a more stringent
fiduciary duty standard. Investment advisers include professionals
who render investment advice, but there is an exclusion for
broker-dealers who are registered, and hence regulated, under the
Exchange Act.16
Both the original House and Senate proposed bills for
financial regulatory reform attempted to change the broker-dealer
fiduciary standard." The approach proposed by the House was "to
harmonize the fiduciary standard for brokers, dealers, and
investment advisers,"'8 while the Senate approach was "to have the
SEC conduct a study to evaluate the effectiveness of existing
standards of conduct for brokers, dealers, and investment
advisers." 9 As one observer put it, Dodd-Frank "forged a kind of
compromise between the House and Senate approaches." 20 The
13. For years, the regulation of broker-dealers was carried out under a system of
self-regulation spearheaded by the NASD.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (2006).
15. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 et seq. (2006). The
Investment Advisers Act is discussed in 7 HAZEN CH. 21 (6th ed. 2009 & Supp. 2011),
supra note 11.
16. Broker-dealers who render advice incidental to their broker-dealer
operations are also excluded from the definition of investment adviser. 15 U.S.C. §
80b-2(a)(11)(A), (B) (2006).
17. MICHAEL V. SEITZINGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41381, THE DODD-
FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: STANDARDS OF
CONDUCT OF BROKERS, DEALERS, AND INVESTMENT ADVISERS 5 (2010).
18. See, e.g., Morrison Foerster News Bulletin, A Fiduciary Duty for Broker-
Dealers? How Dodd-Frank May Change the Way Broker-Dealers Conduct Business
2 (July 19, 2010), http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/100719DoddFrank.pdf
[hereinafter Morrison Foerster] ("The Dodd-Frank Act represents a compromise
between the House bill, which would have eliminated the exclusion for broker-
dealers from the definition of investment advisers, and the Senate bill, which called
for further study of the issue.").
19. SEITZINGER, supra note 17, at 5.
20. Id.; see also, e.g., Jennifer Martella, Baker & McKenzie Client Memo, Dodd-
Frank Act Investor Protection Changes for Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers
(October 2010), available at
http://www.bakermckenzie.com/RRNADoddFrankActlnvestorProtectionOct10/
(stating that Dodd-Frank requires the SEC to complete a study and make
[Vol. 1550
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compromise also brings focus on the current distinctions between
securities broker-dealers and investment advisers.
II. OVERVIEW OF DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN BROKER-DEALER AND
INVESTMENT ADVISER REGULATION
The Investment Advisers Act defines an investment adviser
as:
any person who, for compensation, engages in the
business of advising others, either directly or
through publications or writings, as to the value of
securities or as to the advisability of investing in,
purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for
compensation and as part of a regular business,
issues or promulgates analyses or reports
concerning securities[.]"
This definition of investment adviser excludes "any broker or
dealer whose performance of such services is solely incidental to
the conduct of his business as a broker or dealer and who receives
no special compensation therefor." 22  It has been suggested,
however, "[t]he evolution of securities-related business practices
essentially means broker-dealers and investment advisers currently
engage in a single business."2" One of the commands emanating
from Dodd-Frank is for the SEC to examine whether there should
recommendations on ways to improve investor access to registration information on
brokers and dealers available on the existing Central Registration Depository, as well
as identify additional information that should be made available).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2006).
22. Id.; see also Morgan Clemons, Harmonization vs. Demarcation: The Problems
with a Broker Fiduciary Duty and the Benefits of the Merrill Rule (October 28, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1699274; James
Hamilton, SEC Regulation of Investment Advisers and Brokers in the Brave New
World (2008) (on file with Wolters Kluwer Law & Business),
http://business.cch.com/securitieslaw/news/03-26-08a.pdf.
23. Stephen Joyce, Ketchum Calls for Single Fiduciary Standard, Says FINRA
May Have Role in Enforcement, Sec. L. Daily (BNA) (Nov. 17, 2010), available at
http://news.bna.com/bcln; James Hamilton, supra note 23, at 7 ("Some investment
advisers, for example, may offer services that employ computerized trading programs
and may take an active, discretionary management role over customer accounts.
From the retail investor's prospective [sic], these activities may not be obviously
distinct from those in which brokers typically engage.").
2011] 51
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be more harmonization of broker-dealer and investment adviser
regulation in terms of the duties that are owed to retail customers.
Currently, investment advisers regulated by the Investment
Advisers Act are subject to statutory fiduciary standards. 24  As
explained by the Supreme Court:
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 thus reflects a
congressional recognition "of the delicate fiduciary
nature of an investment advisory relationship," as
well as a congressional intent to eliminate, or at
least to expose, all conflicts of interest which might
incline an investment adviser- consciously or
unconsciously- to render advice which was not
disinterested.25
In contrast, under the Exchange Act, broker-dealers are
not subject to an explicit fiduciary standard but are nevertheless
required to comply with various other standards that include an
obligation of suitability in making investment recommendations to
their customers. Some commentators have observed that the
duties of broker-dealers fall short of a fiduciary obligation.27
Notwithstanding the absence of an explicit fiduciary standard,
broker-dealers are subject to substantially similar requirements
when they act as more than mere order takers for their customers'
transactions. Under the Exchange Act, a variety of self-regulatory
organizations (SROs), including national securities exchanges and
24. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2006).
Specifically, section 206(3) addresses transactions in which the adviser acts as
principal. The courts quite properly have characterized this as a fiduciary standard.
See, e.g., Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 17 (1979)
("Indeed, the Act's legislative history leaves no doubt that Congress intended to
impose enforceable fiduciary obligations."); United States v. Lay, 612 F.3d 440, 445-
447 (6th Cir. 2010) (upholding conviction based on investment advisers breach of
fiduciary duty as embodied in Investment Advisers Act section 206).
25. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191-92 (1963)
(footnote omitted).
26. Joyce, supra note 23.
27. See Morrison Foerster, supra note 18, at 1 ("Broker-dealers have a duty of
fair dealing, duty of best execution, suitability requirements and various disclosure
requirements. While such duties and requirements provide some degree of investor
protection, they fall short of the 'fiduciary' standards described by the SEC.").
52 [Vol. 15
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FINRA, exercise extensive oversight over securities broker-
dealers, stock exchange members and listed companies, and other
market intermediaries.8
A recent Tenth Circuit decision points to the need to
harmonize the rules relating to broker-dealers and investment
advisers in at least some respects. In Thomas v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co.,29 a representative of an insurance company and a
registered broker-dealer recommended a proprietary variable
insurance product that qualifies as a securityso without disclosing
that sales of this product provided an incentive to make this
investment recommendation. The court ruled that since the
representative did not give investment advice generally the
representative's advice was incidental to his role as a broker-
dealer, and thus he was not acting as an investment adviser.'
Moreover, because the representative was not giving general
investment advice, the absence of special compensation for the
advice rendered the advice incidental to his activities as a broker-
dealer.32 Had the sales representative been acting as an investment
adviser, he would have been subject to disclosures regarding
recommendations of proprietary products that are not applicable
to broker-dealers. It seems anomalous to require conflict of
interest disclosures by an investment adviser in this type of
situation but not by a broker-dealer giving investment advice. It is
situations like that in Thomas that reinforce the need to consider
harmonizing invest adviser and broker-dealer duties.
Notwithstanding concern in some quarters over the
different regulatory frameworks for investment advisers and
securities broker-dealers, Congress did not alter the structural
regulatory segmentation that continues to exist. Instead of
28. Saule T. Omavora, Rethinking the Future of Self-Regulation in the Financial
Industry, 35 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 665, 693 (2010).
29. Thomas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., No. 09-6207, 2011 WL 310471 (10th
Cir. Feb. 2, 2011).
30. The variable universal life insurance policy (VULP) that was recommended
to the customer fits within the definition of security. See, e.g., SEC v. United Benefit
Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967) (variable annuity was a security); SEC v. Variable
Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959) (same). See generally 1 HAZEN § 1.6[8],
supra note 11.
31. Thomas, 2011 WL 310471, at *11.
32. Id.at *11-12.
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mandating any specific changes in the regulation of broker-dealers,
Congress punted and left to the SEC the decision of whether to
enhance broker-dealer obligations. It did so through section 913
of Dodd-Frank, which directs the SEC to study various aspects of
broker-dealer and investment adviser regulation.33 Rather than
attempt to paraphrase, the scope of the study is best understood by
the terms of Dodd-Frank itself, which requires the SEC to study
and evaluate:
(1) the effectiveness of existing legal or regulatory
standards of care for brokers, dealers, investment
advisers, persons associated with brokers or dealers,
and persons associated with investment advisers for
providing personalized investment advice and
recommendations about securities to retail
customers imposed by the Commission and a
national securities association, and other Federal
and State legal or regulatory standards; and
(2) whether there are legal or regulatory gaps,
shortcomings, or overlaps in legal or regulatory
standards in the protection of retail customers
relating to the standards of care for brokers, dealers,
investment advisers, persons associated with brokers
or dealers, and persons associated with investment
advisers for providing personalized investment
advice about securities to retail customers that
should be addressed by rule or statute.
Section 913 of Dodd-Frank specifically sets forth the
following considerations, in simplified terms, among others, to be
included within the SEC report: the effectiveness of the current
regulatory standards; the existence of shortcomings in protection
of retail customers under current regulatory standards; the extent
to which retail customers understand the different applicable
33. Dodd-Frank Act, § 913, 124 Stat. 1824-30 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o,
80b-11).
34. Id.
54 [Vol. 15
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standards of care for brokers, dealers, and investment advisers in
relation to retail customers; the question of whether the different
standards are a source of confusion regarding the quality of
investment advice to retail customers; and the substantive
differences in regulation of brokers, dealers, and investment
advisers."
In addition to setting forth the items to be studied, Dodd-
Frank amended Exchange Act section 15(k) to specifically
empower the SEC to regulate broker-dealers providing
personalized investment advice by imposing on them obligations
that are applicable to investment advisers under the Investment
Advisers Act.
Dodd-Frank thus makes it clear that the SEC has the
authority to impose heightened standards of care on securities
broker-dealers. Included in the SEC's discretionary authority
granted by Dodd-Frank, the SEC may by rule require that a
broker or dealer selling only a limited range of products provide
notice to each retail customer and obtain consent.3 6 The SEC shall
also "facilitate the provision of simple and clear disclosures to
investors regarding the terms of their relationships with brokers,
dealers, and investment advisers, including any material conflicts
of interest[.]" 7 Dodd-Frank also mandates that the SEC consider
promulgating rules that prohibit or restrict certain sales practices,
conflicts of interest, and compensation schemes.3" Furthermore,
the standard of conduct allowed is that the SEC may create rules
which require brokers, dealers, and investment advisers to act in
the best interest of the customer.3 9 Dodd-Frank states that if the
SEC does adopt rules imposing a best interest of the customer
requirement, these "rules shall provide that such standard of
conduct shall be no less stringent than the standard applicable to
investment advisers . . . except the Commission shall not ascribe a
meaning to the term 'customer' that would include an investor in a
35. Id.
36. Id. (amending Securities Exchange Act of 1934 section 15(k)(2)).
37. Id. (amending Securities Exchange Act of 1934 section 15(1)).
38. Id.
39. Dodd-Frank Act, § 913(g), 124 Stat. 1828-29 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. H§
78o, 80b-11).
2011] 55
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private fund managed by an investment adviser[.]" 40 Congress thus
focused on retail investors in the message it sent to the SEC in
Dodd-Frank. Accordingly, the SEC must evaluate whether
existing regulation is sufficient to provide protection to retail
investors. If nothing else, this will give the SEC the opportunity to
review the already robust regulation that applies to broker-
dealers when broker-dealers do more than merely execute
customer orders. As pointed out more fully below, while broker-
dealer regulation may need some fine tuning, a very firm base
already exists. In addition, imposing a fiduciary duty when
broker-dealers do more than execute customer orders would not
by itself impose significantly higher burdens on them. Explicit
recognition of fiduciary obligations would, however, provide a
meaningful emphasis on the regulation that already exists.
III. PRINCIPLES-BASED AND RULES-BASED REGULATION
The SEC, the NASD, and now FINRA developed their
regulations in a piecemeal fashion. As noted above, a good deal of
broker-dealer conduct is addressed under the umbrella of
regulating according to fair and just principles of trade.42 Also,
much of the SEC's rulemaking authority is based on the ability to
prohibit fraudulent, manipulative, and deceptive devices.43 One
issue that has developed over the last decade is the extent to which
principles-based regulation, or the setting of general standards,
should be further supplemented by rulemaking addressing specific
40. Id. (noting that "[t]he receipt of compensation based on commission or fees
shall not, in and of itself, be considered a violation of such standard applied to a
broker, dealer, or investment adviser.").
41. For a discussion of the robust regulation that exists see 5 HAZEN CH. 14,
supra note 11.
42. See, e.g., FINRA Manual Rule 2010 ("Standards of Commercial Honor and
Principles of Trade") ("A member, in the conduct of its business, shall observe high
standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade."), available
at
http://finra.complinet.comlen/display/display-main.html?rbid=2403&elementid=550
4.
43. Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act empowers the SEC to promulgate rules to
outlaw manipulative and deceptive devices in connection with the purchase or sale of
a security. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). Section 15(c) of the Exchange Act gives the
SEC similar rulemaking authority with respect to broker-dealer activities. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(c) (2006).
56 [Vol. 15
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types of conduct. There has been an ongoing debate as to whether
principles-based or rules-based regulation is preferable." This
article takes the position that broker-dealer regulation contains an
appropriate mix of principles-based and rules-based regulation.
Following the financial crisis and frauds such as the ones
perpetrated by Bernard Madoff,45 there was considerable talk of
creating explicit broker-dealer fiduciary duties. Although this
inspired fear within the industry,46 it is far from clear that such a
mandate would significantly change the current law. These calls
for heightened duties also arose in the context of the Goldman
Sachs investigation. Goldman Sachs was investigated by the SEC
and by Congress for its role in the over-the-counter derivatives
markets. Specifically, there was concern over Goldman's role as
fabricator of certain derivative instruments and the ways in which
it marketed them to its customers.47 Goldman maintained that it
was merely acting as a market maker, and as such, had no
disclosure duties to its customers in allegedly betting against the
investments that it was marketing. This led many to suggest that it
needed to be clarified that brokers are in fact fiduciaries.48 The
SEC brought charges against Goldman 9 claiming that Goldman
breached its obligations as a broker of these privately placed
derivatives. The SEC's long-standing implicit recognition of
broker-dealer fiduciary duties even without the proposed more
44. See, e.g., ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 37 n.1 (2d ed. 2001). Cf Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the
Rhetoric of "Principles-Based Systems" in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation, and
Accounting, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1411 (2007) (suggesting that drawing a distinct
dichotomy between rules and principles oversimplifies complexity).
45. Cf Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., 728 F. Supp. 354 (S.D. N.Y. 2010)
(upholding state law claims against defendants who steered investors to Madoff
controlled investments).
46. See, e.g., Joe Rauch, Retail Brokers Fear New Law Could Bring Sea Change,
REUTERS (Oct. 30, 2009, 4:39 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE59T4C120091030 (noting that the proposed
fiduciary duty language was suggested by SEC Chair Mary Schapiro).
47. See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, Goldman Acknowledges Conflicts with Clients,
N.Y. TIMES DEALBK (Jan. 12, 2010, 11:30 AM),
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/12/goldman-executive-discloses-conflicts-
policy/.
48. See SEC STUDY, supra note 10, at 109.
49. See SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co. (2010),
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp-pr2OlO-59.pdf.
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explicit recognition seems adequate to address Goldman's market
maker defense. A more explicit fiduciary obligation would clearly
address the obligations of those brokers who brought their clients
to Bernard Madoff. Nevertheless, it is far from clear that these
obligations do not exist under current law. The Goldman Sachs
settlemento means, among other things, that the extent of
Goldman's obligations to its clients was not clarified by the courts.
As discussed below, there is plenty of authority under the existing
law that recognizes heightened obligations of securities broker-
dealers, at least when they are acting in a capacity beyond a mere
order taker.
IV. FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS - ARE MORE EXPLICIT RULES
NECESSARY?
The securities laws are primarily focused on disclosure and
preventing fraud. The law of fraud itself raises the rules versus
standards dichotomy. Since the nineteenth century, both courts"
50. See SEC, Litigation Release No. 21592 (July 15, 2010),
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr2l592.htm; Patricia Hurtado &
Christine Harper, SEC Settlement with Goldman Sachs for $550 Million Approved by
U.S. Judge, BLOOMBERG (July 21, 2010, 12:01 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-20/goldman-sachs-settlement-with-sec-for-
550-million-approved-by-u-s-judge.html.
51. See, e.g., McAleer v. Horsey, 35 Md. 439, 452 (1872):
The common law not only gives no definition of fraud, but perhaps
wisely asserts as a principle that there shall be no definition of it,
for, as it is the very nature and essence of fraud to elude all laws in
fact, without appearing to break them in form, a technical
definition of fraud, making everything come within the scope of its
words before the law could deal with it as such, would be in effect
telling to the crafty precisely how to avoid the grasp of the law.
Id. See also, e.g., Syracuse Knitting Co. v. Blanchard, 43 A. 637, 639 (N.H. 1899):
It is difficult to define fraud, except in a very general way. It is
variable, depending upon the circumstances of the case. Those who
make use of it adopt ways that have the appearance of good faith.
Great skill is often shown in the attempt to make that which is
false and corrupt appear true and honest. Hard and fast rules of
law would be a hindrance to the discovery of fraud.
Id. Accord Arkansas Valley Compress & Warehouse Co. v. Morgan, 229 S.W.2d 133,
164 (Ark. 1950) ("[C]ourts have always been reluctant to define 'fraud' (either actual
58 [Vol. 15
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and commentators52 have suggested that defining fraud provides
unscrupulous actors with an invitation to find a way around the
law. The law thus recognizes that it is sufficient to identify a
principle rather than focusing on specific detailed definitions of the
types of conduct to be prohibited.
Particularly helpful to understanding the nature of the
broker-customer relationship is the Restatement of Torts'
explanation: "[a] fiduciary relation exists between two persons
when one of them is under a duty to act or to give advice for the
benefit of another upon matters within the scope of the relation."54
It follows that even absent a specific statutory or rule-based
mandate, broker-dealers are under heightened obligations when
doing more than merely executing customer orders.
Supplementing the existing mandate that broker-dealers
live up to just and equitable principles of trade with an explicit
fiduciary obligation without specific rules explaining the conduct
included would not add much if anything to existing law.
Although there is no clear definition of fiduciary relationship,
or constructive) lest man's fertile mind invent a new scheme outside the definition
but just as nefarious as previously denounced schemes."(footnote omitted)).
52. Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV.
345, 410 (1994) ("[C]ommon law jurists . . . refused to 'lay down as a general
proposition, what shall constitute fraud, or any general rule, beyond which they will
not go upon the ground of fraud, lest other means of avoiding the equity of the courts
should be found out."' (quoting JOSEPH STORY, 1 EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 186 at
190 (10th ed. 1870))); see also, e.g., id. at 410 n. 316 ("Some lawyers talk as though
they thought maximum clarity always desirable even though they wouldn't have to
probe very deeply to find that fraud, and fiduciary obligation, and undue influence,
have been carefully isolated from exact definition, because such exact definition
would simply point out safe ways of immunity, and, to the birds of prey, make the law
'their perch and not their terror."' (quoting CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE HUMANE
IMAGINATION 33 (1986))).
53. U.S. v. Bishop, 825 F.2d 1278, 1280 (8th Cir. 1987) ("'[T]he law does
not define fraud; it needs no definition. It is as old as falsehood and as versable as
human ingenuity."'(quoting Weiss v. U.S., 122 F.2d 675, 681 (5th Cir. 1941))); Greco
v. State, 499 A.2d 209 (Md. App. 1985) (stating that courts "have been reluctant to
define fraud with any degree of preciseness"), aff'd, 515 A.2d 220 (Md. 1986).
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 cmt. a (1979).
55. See, e.g., Franklin Supply Co. v. Tolman, 454 F.2d 1059, 1065 (9th Cir.
1972) ("A 'fiduciary relation' is an elusive status to define."); Keenan v. D.H. Blair &
Co., Inc., 838 F. Supp. 82, 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("The precise contours of
a fiduciary relationship are incapable of expression."); Farragut Mortgage Co., Inc. v.
Arthur Andersen, LLP, No. 95-6231-B, 1999 WL 823656, at *14 (Mass. Super.
1999) (finding that there is no all-inclusive definition of a fiduciary relationship; the
existence of such a relationship is a question of fact).
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some important generalizations can provide good guidance. A
fiduciary relationship consists of two parties, the fiduciary and the
beneficiary. It is generally understood that in such a relationship,
the fiduciary has the duty to be loyal and act in the interest of the
beneficiary. 6 The beneficiary has entrusted the fiduciary with the
power to oversee his well-being." The beneficiary is dependent
upon the fiduciary due to his reliance upon a specific service the
fiduciary provides under the arrangement in question." The
beneficiary ordinarily has very little or no control over the
relationship or its subject matter, and thus the beneficiary is forced
to rely on the fiduciary's expertise in the specific area. 9 In other
words, a fiduciary relationship often exists when one person places
his trust and confidence in another. There is reliance upon the
fiduciary that the fiduciary will not abuse this trust and
confidence.6o Described in yet another way, a fiduciary
relationship is said to exist when any person instills a power of
some type in another (the fiduciary) with the intention that the
fiduciary act to further the beneficiary's best interests.
V. THE PRESENT STATE OF BROKER-DEALER REGULATION
In addressing broker-dealer obligations, the SEC
proceeded with rulemaking largely under the general anti-fraud
provisions of sections 10(b)62 and 15(c) 61 of the Exchange Act,
section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933,' and section 206 of the
56. See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary
Obligation, 1988 DUKE L. J. 879, 882 (1988); D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource
Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1402 (2002); Victor Brudney,
Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REV. 595, 624 (1997).
57. See, e.g., Kelli A. Alces, Debunking the Corporate Fiduciary Myth, 35 J. CORP.
L. 239,240 (2009).
58. See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795,800 (1983).
59. See Kelli A. Alces, Debunking the Corporate Fiduciary Myth, 35 J. CORP. L.
239, 241 (2009). See also, e.g., Frankel, supra note 58.
60. See Alces, supra note 59, at 240-42. See also, e.g., DeMott, supra note 56, at
902; D. Gordon Smith, supra note 56, at 1413.
61. See Alces, supra note 59, at 260.
62. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). See 3 HAZEN § 12.1, supra note 11.
63. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (2006).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2006).
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Investment Advisers Act.6 ' The SEC's attention has been focused
on two broad areas: (a) conflicts between the firm's obligations to
its customers and its own financial interests,8 and (b) trading in or
recommending securities in the absence of adequate information
about the issuer.67 Violation of the anti-fraud provisions in these
two areas has given rise to lawsuits by aggrieved customerse as
well as disciplinary actions by the SEC.69 There is a wide range of
approaches taken by the SEC, FINRA, and the courts in
regulating broker-dealers with respect to (1) excessive prices for
NASDAQ and over-the-counter securities;o (2) activities of
market makers that deal directly with individual customers in a
retail capacity;" (3) excessive trading in customers' accounts
designed to generate brokerage commissions;72 and (4) undisclosed
interests of brokers and investment advisers in the stocks they
recommend. 73
65. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2006).
66. See 5 HAZEN §§ 14.3, 14.10, supra note 11 (discussing applicable regulations).
67. See 5 HAZEN §§ 14.15-14.18, supra note 11.
68. See 5 HAZEN CH. 15 and § 14.26, supra note 11.
69. See 5 HAZEN § 14.3, supra note 11. The SEC's enforcement authority is
generally discussed in chapter sixteen. See id.
70. See, e.g., Lehl v. SEC, 90 F.3d 1483, 1488 n. 4 (10th Cir. 1996):
To guide its members in determining when a price is "reasonably
related to the current market price," the NASD surveyed industry
pricing practices, concluding that the vast majority of transactions
occurred at markups of 5% or less. It then issued guidelines
setting 5% as a benchmark of reasonableness, to be considered
with other relevant factors. The NASD cautioned, however, that
the 5% policy "is a guide- not a rule"; that a "mark-up pattern of
5% or even less may be considered unfair or unreasonable"; and
that "[i]n the case of certain low-priced securities, such as those
selling below $10.00, a somewhat higher percentage may
sometimes be justified."
Id.(citation omitted); 5 HAZEN § 14.14, supra note 11.
71. See, e.g., Eichler v. SEC, 757 F.2d 1066 (9th Cir. 1985) (affirming the SEC's
finding that a market maker's duty to execute customer orders meant that it could
not base pricing and order execution on an orderly market without making full
disclosure to its customers). See also 5 HAZEN § 14.10, supra note 11 (stating that
market makers operate in the over the counter and Nasdaq markets and in essence
operate as wholesalers of securities).
72. This is often referred to as "churning." See 5 HAZEN § 14.20, supra note 11.
73. This is sometimes referred to as "scalping." Scalping consists of material
omissions from the recommendation- namely that the person making the
recommendation has a position in the security being recommended. A variation on
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Although much of broker-dealer regulation is principles-
based, there are specific rules addressing certain types of conduct.
There are various SEC and FINRA (formerly NASD) rules that
address particular types of misconduct by broker-dealers. As a
general standard, SEC Rule 15c1-2 7 4  generally prohibits
fraudulent, manipulative, and deceptive practices in connection
with securities brokerage transactions. The types of specific
conduct that are addressed in other rules include market
manipulation, high pressure sales tactics, deceptive
77 * 78
recommendations, generation of excessive commissions,
unauthorized trading," improper order executions," improper
extension of credit for securities transactions81 and misuse of
customer funds or securities.82 In addition, broker-dealers and their
employees are subject to a more standards- based approach under
Rule 10b-5's general antifraud proscriptions relating to deceptive
conduct in connection with a purchase or sale of a security.
Beyond these specific activities and the general anti-manipulation
and deception rules, the SEC makes it clear that violation of its
rules is not limited to violation of any specified SEC or SRO rules,
but rather covers all conduct that operates as a deceptive or
scalping occurs when the person making the recommendation affirmatively
misrepresents that he or she does not own any of the securities recommended. See,
e.g., In re Snyder, Exchange Act Release No. 46108, 2002 WL 1364075 (June 25,
2002) (violation of Rule 10b-5 for stating that respondent did not have an ownership
position through Internet communications made about a particular company); 5
HAZEN § 14.17, supra note 11.
74. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c1-2 (2010).
75. See 2 HAZEN §§ 6.2-6.3, supra note 11 (manipulation in connection with
public offerings); 3 HAZEN § 12.1, supra note 11 (manipulation generally); 5 HAZEN §
14.10[5], supra note 11 (manipulation by market makers).
76. See 5 HAZEN § 14.18, supra note 11; see also, e.g., News Release, FINRA,
NASD Hearing Panel Expels Yankee Financial for Fraud, Orders Payment of More
Than $3.8 Million in Restitution (Jan. 13, 2005), available at
http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2005/P012997 (boiler-room operator
expelled from NASD membership and ordered to pay more than $3.8 million in
restitution).
77. See 5 HAZEN §§ 14.15-14.18, supra note 11.
78. See id. at § 14.20.
79. See id. at § 14.21.
80. See id. at § 14.13.
81. See id. at § 14.9.
82. See id. at § 14.8[2].
83. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
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manipulative device.8 This broad coverage thus is not limited to
specific SEC rules. The SEC has taken the position elsewhere that
it can regulate conduct that would be manipulative even if the
concern is not based on any specified violation of existing rules.
As pointed out above, there is considerable regulation in
place dealing with broker-dealer conduct. Although there may
have been some serious enforcement lapses, the broker-dealer
regulatory rules structure is not broken. This is not to say that the
SEC cannot improve things. An explicit statement that broker-
dealers are fiduciaries will add emphasis to the obligations under
existing law but will not provide significant additional regulation.
To the extent that the SEC finds existing rulemaking to be
deficient in protecting retail investors, then specific rules may be
necessary to fill the holes that the SEC identifies.
The study and inquiry mandated by Dodd-Frank provides
the SEC with an opportunity to fine tune a regulatory system over
broker-dealers that basically works. There is no need to
significantly overhaul the nature of broker-dealer regulation. The
clear mandate of Dodd-Frank is to focus the SEC on vigorous
enforcement of broker-dealer obligations. The exercise of going
through the mandated study in and of itself has the salutary effect
of bringing these issues to the forefront even if no significant
additional rulemaking is forthcoming. The SEC study that was
released in January 2011 calls for a unified standard for broker-
dealers and investment advisers." At the same time, the study
84. SEC Rule 15c1-2(c) reads:
The scope of this section shall not be limited by any specific
definitions of the term "manipulative, deceptive, or other
fraudulent device or contrivance" contained in other rules adopted
pursuant to section 15(c)(1) of the act.
17 C.F.R. § 240.15c1-2(c) (2010).
85. See, e.g., In re Trautman, Securities Act Release No. 33-9088A, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-61167A, 2009 WL 6761741 *19 n.75 (Dec. 15, 2009) (noting that late
trading of mutual funds violated the Exchange Act even in the absence of an SEC
rule specifically addressing that activity); In re Hazel Bishop, Inc., Securities Act
Release No. 33-4371, 1961 WL 61528 (June 7, 1961) (wherein the Commission held
up a registration statement because of the potential for manipulation in connection
with an at market secondary offering); see generally 2 HAZEN CH. 6 and § 4.28, supra
note 11.
86. See SEC STUDY, supra note 10. The SEC staff study's recommendation
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leaves it for another day to decide whether this requires additional
rulemaking or whether the unified standard can be achieved
through administrative interpretations and guidance. With respect
to the chances of new rulemaking in the near future, a statement
by two SEC commissioners signals their likely opposition.87 The
joint statement by two of the five commissioners points out that
the views addressed in this and similar SEC studies represent those
"of the Staff of the Commission and not necessarily those of the
Commission as a whole or of individual Commissioners."
The 166 page SEC staff study went beyond Dodd-Frank's
recommendation in favor of a unified standard. As stated in the
report:
Implementing the Uniform Fiduciary Standard: The
garnered the support of state securities administrators as embodied in the statement
of the North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA):
The SEC staff recommendation to apply a fiduciary duty to
broker-dealers who provide personalized investment advice about
securities to retail customers will have a significant positive impact
on investors.
State securities regulators routinely see the financial devastation
caused when the interests of investors do not come first. That is
why NASAA has consistently urged policymakers to protect
investors by requiring all who provide investment advice about
securities to be held to the fiduciary duty currently applicable to
investment advisers under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.
We look forward to assisting the Commission as it develops new
rules to apply a fiduciary standard of care and loyalty to all who
provide investment advice to ensure that this standard is as strong
as the existing fiduciary duty of the Advisers Act.
Statement, NASAA, NASAA Statement on SEC Study on the Obligations of
Brokers, Dealers and Investment Advisers (Jan. 24, 2011), available at
http://www.nasaa.org/NASAA-Newsroom/CurrentNASAAHeadlines/13868.cfm
(quotations omitted).
87. See Statement, SEC, Statement by SEC Commissioners: Statement
Regarding Study On Investment Advisers And Broker-Dealers (Jan. 21, 2011),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speechl2011/spch012211klctap.htm ("[W]e
oppose the Study's release to Congress as drafted. We do not believe the Study
fulfills the statutory mandate of Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Act to evaluate the
'effectiveness of existing legal or regulatory standards of care' applicable to broker-
dealers and investment advisers.").
88. See id.
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Commission should engage in rulemaking and/or
issue interpretive guidance addressing the
components of the uniform fiduciary standard: the
duties of loyalty and care. In doing so, the
Commission should identify specific examples of
potentially relevant and common material conflicts
of interest in order to facilitate a smooth transition
to the new standard by broker-dealers and
consistent interpretations by broker-dealers and
investment advisers. The Staff is of the view that the
existing guidance and precedent under the Advisers
Act regarding fiduciary duty, as developed primarily
through Commission interpretive pronouncements
under the antifraud provisions of the Advisers Act,
and through case law and numerous enforcement
actions, will continue to apply.
Duty of Loyalty: A uniform standard of conduct will
obligate both investment advisers and broker-
dealers to eliminate or disclose conflicts of interest.
The Commission should prohibit certain conflicts
and facilitate the provision of uniform, simple and
clear disclosures to retail investors about the terms
of their relationships with broker-dealers and
investment advisers, including any material conflicts
of interest.
Principal Trading: The Commission should address
through interpretive guidance and/or rulemaking
how broker-dealers should fulfill the uniform
fiduciary standard when engaging in principal
trading.
Duty of Care: The Commission should consider
specifying uniform standards for the duty of care
owed to retail investors, through rulemaking and/or
interpretive guidance. Minimum baseline
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professionalism standards could include, for
example, specifying what basis a broker-dealer or
investment adviser should have in making a
recommendation to an investor.
Personalized Investment Advice About Securities:
The Commission should engage in rulemaking
and/or issue interpretive guidance to explain what it
means to provide "personalized investment advice
about securities."89
The study also makes specific recommendations regarding
what the harmonization of broker-dealer and investment adviser
regulation likely would entail.90 It is clear from the staff report
that complete harmonization would involve substantial revision of
existing rules.9' If it is to be achieved, complete harmonization
89. See SEC STUDY, supra note 10, at vi-vii (recommending a consideration of
additional investor education)(bullets omitted).
90. Id. at viii-x.
91. Id. at viii-ix:
Harmonization of Regulation: The Staff believes that a
harmonization of regulation-where such harmonization adds
meaningful investor protection-would offer several advantages,
including that it would provide retail investors the same or
substantially similar protections when obtaining the same or
substantially similar services from investment advisers and broker-
dealers. The following recommendations address certain other
areas where investment adviser and broker-dealer laws and
regulations differ, and where the Commission should consider
whether laws and regulations that apply to these functions should
be harmonized for the benefit of retail investors:
Advertising and Other Communications: The Commission should
consider articulating consistent substantive advertising and
customer communication rules and/or guidance for broker-dealers
and investment advisers regarding the content of advertisements
and other customer communications for similar services. In
addition, the Commission should consider, at a minimum,
harmonizing internal pre-use review requirements for investment
adviser and broker-dealer advertisements or requiring investment
advisers to designate employees to review and approve
advertisements.
Use of Finders and Solicitors: The Commission should review the
use of finders and solicitors by investment advisers and broker-
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would likely take a number of years of rule-making and
implementation.
Even in the absence of new rules and regulations
harmonizing broker-dealer regulation, the study supports the
thesis of this article. The study includes an extensive analysis of
existing broker-dealer regulation and interpretations, recognizing,
dealers and consider whether to provide additional guidance or
harmonize existing regulatory requirements to address the status
of finders and solicitors and their respective relevant disclosure
requirements to assure that retail customers better understand the
conflicts associated with the solicitor's and finder's receipt of
compensation for sending a retail customer to an adviser or
broker-dealer.
Supervision: The Commission should review supervisory
requirements for investment advisers and broker-dealers, with a
focus on whether any harmonization would facilitate the
examination and oversight of these entities (e.g., whether detailed
supervisory structures would not be appropriate for a firm with a
small number of employees) and consider whether to provide any
additional guidance or engage in rulemaking.
Licensing and Registration of Firms: The Commission should
consider whether the disclosure requirements in Form ADV and
Form BD should be harmonized where they address similar issues,
so that regulators and retail investors have access to comparable
information. The Commission also should consider whether
investment advisers should be subject to a substantive review prior
to registration.
Licensing and Continuing Education Requirements for Persons
Associated with Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers: The
Commission could consider requiring investment adviser
representatives to be subject to federal continuing education and
licensing requirements.
Books and Records: The Commission should consider whether to
modify the Advisers Act books and records requirements,
including by adding a general requirement to retain all
communications and agreements (including electronic information
and communications and agreements) related to an adviser's
"business as such," consistent with the standard applicable to
broker-dealers.
92. See, e.g., Bruce Kelly, Fiduciary Standard Not Happening Until Mid-2012:
Ketchum, INVESTMENT NEWS (Feb. 1, 2011, 12:10 PM),
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/211O2O1/FREE/110209981 (FINRA CEO
predicting that any rulemaking implementing a fiduciary duty standard for broker-
dealers will be a slow process).
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as pointed out above, that SEC and self-regulatory decisions and
interpretations as they currently exist provide a rich basis for
holding broker-dealers accountable beyond mere anti-fraud rules.
Accordingly, the absence of an immediate regulatory response
consistent with the SEC staff study should in no way impede
vigorous enforcement of broker-dealer obligations. In particular,
this includes vigorous enforcement of fiduciary principles when
broker-dealers are acting in a capacity beyond that of a mere order
taker.
